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AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS & DOMESTIC
SECURITY
Moderator: Anne Toomey McKenna
Panelists: David Atkinson, Douglas Burig, Marc Canellas, and Alan Wagner
Anne Toomey
McKenna:

We have had some general conversations
today. In this panel, besides trying to make sure
that we wake you up since you just ate lunch,
we are going to really try to give some more
specific examples. One of the things that I
want you to understand is how exciting it is to
have these experts here. They bring a different
focus than some of what we have been hearing
from today. We have a wide array of people
today, but we are going to be focusing on
autonomous systems in domestic society and
autonomous systems from a domestic security
perspective.
I am very excited to welcome here today, to
Penn State, the panelists we have. First, sitting
next to me, or right beside me, is Dr. David
Atkinson. He is the head of systems and
technology, and he is the chief research
scientist for artificial intelligence (AI) at
Continental Silicon Valley Research and
Development Center. He oversees systems and
technology projects for future transportation
and mobility systems with a focus on intelligent
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driver assistance, autonomous vehicles and
smart cities. He has worked at the Florida
Institute for Human and Machine Cognition,
leading research projects and trustworthiness
on autonomous robotic systems. He has
previously worked for twenty years with
NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory at CalTech, and he was a founder of NASA’s
artificial intelligence program. Dr. Atkinson
has made significant contributions; and he
continues to, in the world of autonomous
vehicles, be a pioneering thought leader. He
has dual degrees from Yale University: a Master
of Science degree and a Master of Philosophy
degree. The focus of his degrees are computer
science and artificial intelligence. So, we are
very happy to have him here.
Anne Toomey
McKenna:

Sitting next to him is Professor Alan Wagner,
Penn State’s own. He is from our Department
of Aerospace Engineering, and he is a Research
Associate with our Rock Ethics Institute. He
received his PhD from the Georgia Institute of
Technology. Dr. Wagner researches and
develops techniques that allow robots to
interact with people in a variety of different
social contexts. If you ever look at the Penn
State News Day Today feed, he is in there, I
feel like every week, for the fascinating work he
is doing. That, or that he is a really good
communications director. He is investigating
deception, human robot trust and the
conditions which encourage people or
discourage people from trusting robots. He is
also—this is I think, particularly fascinating
considering—researching robots that can
evaluate whether or not they should trust
people.
151
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Dr. Wagner’s research has won numerous
awards. His research on deception has had
significant notoriety in the media. Not just
Penn State, but the Wall Street Journal, New
Scientist magazine, Journal of Science, and his
work was described by Time Magazine as the
thirteenth most important invention. Again, he
holds numerous accolades and awards to his
credit, and he holds a Master’s degree in
Computer Science from Boston University and
an undergraduate degree in psychology from
Northwestern University in addition to his
PhD. Then, I’m going to jump over you for a
second there.
I’m just the odd one out.
And so, we’ll come back to that in a minute.
Next, we have Major Douglas (Doug) Burig,
who is a Major here with our Pennsylvania
State Police. There are really very few Majors if
you’re unfamiliar with the ranking of that
system. There are over six thousand officers
employed with the Pennsylvania State Police,
and only eleven of those are Majors. He is the
overall director for the Pennsylvania State
Police’s Bureau of Criminal Investigation, and
that falls under the umbrella of the Bureau of
Criminal Investigation. His background: he has
served for over two decades as an officer,
including the Commander of the Analytical
Intelligence section, as he brings up while
talking with him at lunch. He worked his way
up through the ranks. His experience in
analytics and use of predictive abilities really
bring us a lot of information here today. He has
a BA in Political Science, and he holds a
152
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Masters in Science degree in Administration of
Justice and Homeland Security.
Anne Toomey
McKenna:

Then sitting in between, we have a 1L. We have
Dr. Marc Canellas. While he is a JD student at
NYU School of Law, he is also NYU’s
Jacobsen Leadership Program in Law and
Business Scholar and Cybersecurity Service
Scholar. His current legal tech research focuses
on technological civil rights movements, the
use of predictive policing, and biometrics
including face recognition.
Again, Dr. Canellas, though while he may be a
law student now, his CV is remarkable. He has
a PhD in Aerospace and Cognitive
Engineering from the Georgia Institute of
Technology, where he studied human decision
making and human machine interaction. His
postdoctoral research at the Cognitive
Engineering Center at the Georgia Institute of
Technology’s
School
of
Aerospace
Engineering
involved
mathematical
computation and human subject studies
towards developing decision support tools for
military command. He’s a voting member of
the IEEE-USA Artificial Intelligence and
Autonomous Systems Policy Committee. He
has served as an IEEE Congressional Science
and Technology Fellow in the United States
House of Representatives where he was
responsible for legislation, appropriations and
media for aerospace, cyber security, privacy
and surveillance science, technology, AI,
robotics. His research has already been
published in numerous journals, in media
outlets, national security outlets, and he has
won awards from the National Science
Foundation and the Max Planck Institute for
153
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Human Development in Berlin. He earned his
BS in Mechanical Engineering from the
University of Missouri, and his Masters of
Science and PhD in Aerospace Engineering
from Georgia Institute of Technology.
Anne Toomey
McKenna:

I already said today we are going to be talking
about domestic systems, and what a range of
people to have bring this to us. And we are
going to get really specific about it. But I want
to set the stage because we have had some
theoretical discussions and we really want to
break this down today in very concrete, real
examples of how technology, law, autonomous
systems, and what is really happening and what
we think of this. We have challenges in this
question about, what, really, from the domestic
standpoint, is not a theoretical or a
philosophical standpoint, but a domestic
standpoint: what is the law? And we are talking
about this. And so, there’ are several problems
that focus on this. One is definition-based, one
is knowledge-based, and then there is realitybased.
We keep hearing these terms, “autonomous
systems” today, and we have heard some very
extreme examples from autonomous systems
and weapons. We have heard just the potential.
A lot of debate that has been very provocative
and thought provoking. But when we say
“autonomous systems” from a legal
standpoint, what does that mean? Your phone
is loaded with autonomous systems. Are we
talking about Skynet? Are we talking about
Alexa? What are we talking about when we talk
about autonomous systems? Part of our
problem and the challenges in this is
154
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knowledge-based: do consumers, policymakers
and lawyers even understand AI? Do they
understand autonomous systems? And then,
this other part is reality-based. Again, we keep
hearing theoretical conversations. But AI and
autonomous systems are pervasive now. They
are what you do on a daily basis. We did hear
some great examples about—I think it was
General Dunlap—”I go the way it tells me to
go.” That is autonomous systems controlling
your present-day behavior, designing and
controlling how you interact with the world.
Anne Toomey
McKenna:

We continue to see, though, just the concept of
autonomous systems and domestic society are
not regulated in the way that the concepts of
military use of autonomous systems may or
may not be regulated. But that is where we tend
to see the technological advances that are
changing and shaping all of our lives.
When we look at this, we are going to talk
about systems, both the design and the data
that is collected. But then, how this data is
actually aggregated? How it is used? How it is
used by police? How it is used by researchers?
And so, we’re going to be trying to keep this
concept of “private sector” in action and
impact on these broader questions of civil
liberty. Part of the problem when we talk about
law and autonomous systems is: what laws
regulate autonomous systems? What regulates
AI? We have this crazy patchwork of laws and
a sectoral approach in the US that makes it very
challenging to explain this to someone not
steeped in the technology or law in this area.
And so I have highlighted the regulatory
agencies in these giant bubbles. We are pulling
155
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from multiple sources of law that may or may
not influence, or control, or regulate
autonomous systems. But I want to focus to
give you an example on that regulatory
agencies for a minute.
Anne Toomey
McKenna:

Autonomous systems in the US, again, are
sector-based and state-based. When we talk
about autonomous cars, like self-driving
vehicles, well, we are talking about the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration that is
producing regulation and mandates –
legislative mandates that embed AI technology
in every vehicle in the United States by federal
law – and the goal is to get to the point of
communication to vehicle to vehicle
communication. If we want to talk about
UAVs, which somebody will touch on today, it
is the Federal Aviation Administration. If you
want to talk about websites and online activity
and algorithms that are controlling what you
see or do not see on websites, that is the FTC,
the Federal Trade Commission.
Just as a quick overview, we also have our
federal laws and our state laws: part of the
problem in this. Then before I turn it over to
these, my esteemed colleagues here, this is
really timely. Yesterday on the NPR driving up
here, Ralph Nader is on this. So, in the most
recent Boeing crash, Ralph Nader’s grandniece
was killed. It was a twenty-four-year-old
woman, and Ralph Nader is a consumer
advocate. This quote, though, I think really
frames almost everything we’ve heard today in
these panels, and what we heard last night from
Paul. So, this is a harbinger talking about this
crash, medical technology, autonomous
156
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weapons, self-driving cars. “It’s the arrogance
of the algorithms, not augmenting human
intelligence, but overriding it and replacing it.”
The significance of this Boeing disaster is that
it can teach us some very important lessons
about maintaining human intelligence, and not
seeding it autonomous to systems that have no
moral base and intuition.
Anne Toomey
McKenna:

David Atkinson:
Anne Toomey
McKenna:

David Atkinson:

With that, I am going to turn this over to David
Atkinson. Again, he is one of the country’s
leading . . .
Oh, stop.
Okay, sorry. He is really cool. But I just want
to set the stage for us with an overview of AI
supported autonomous systems, how they
function in domestic society and their
increasing use. I actually hope you can also just
loop in that 5G point as that is changing.
I will. Yes. Thank you very much.
Yeah, okay. Thank you very much, and
sometimes it is hard to continue on a Friday
afternoon after lunch, and I appreciate you
being here. I realized part of my challenge is to
stimulate you for the remaining part of the
symposium, and we will see how many heads
go down and give me some real-time feedback.
I published my first paper on autonomous
robotics in 1984. In retrospect, it is a terrible
paper. But it tells you that I have been thinking
about this for a very long time, and my career
has been devoted in various positions to
autonomous systems in one form or another.
157

2020

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

Symposium Issue

A very long time with NASA JPL and deep
space exploration, working for the Air Force,
doing my own research, and lots of other work
for NASA, and now was time to go do
something that would take all that interesting
work that I was aware of, and that I could do,
and infuse it into the Society for some social
benefit.
David Atkinson:

There were lots of different ways of doing that,
and I chose automotive. Because if you look in
the parking lot, every one of those cars has
parts. My company, Continental, makes most
of those parts. I think the only thing we don’t
make is a steering wheel, but you don’t need
that for that for an autonomous vehicle
anyway. I’m going to keep this really realitybased.
I am prone to going off in technology
speculation sometimes, and forward casting,
vision casting. But my job here is to tell you
what is. What is the current state of things?
And I am going to talk to you about it from the
point of view of commercial products. Not
from what’s running in the laboratory, but
what is real today.
One exciting part of the job that I do is I get to
go visit the companies that buy stuff from us:
all the OEMs, FORD, GM. I am not going to
name them all, but those companies that use
the parts and so I can see what they are doing
in the state of autonomous vehicles. I go visit
startups, of which there are many in Silicon
Valley, and see what they’re doing. And so, I
have accumulated this pretty nice overview, I
think, that gives me a chance to share this
information now with you.
158
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First thing to realize, you interact with
intelligent systems every day, if you use a credit
card, if you use a travel agent, if you—well, lots
of things. Just trust me on this. They’ve been
deployed since 1990s. Now, the important
thing to remember is that there are lots of
different aspects to artificial intelligence. And
so, at different times in the history of AI,
certain tools and techniques have become
prominent, and other times faded. Parts of AI
have—people will no longer even think of AI.
Object-oriented programming, which is a
conventional part of programming languages,
was originally invented by a researcher named
Hewitt to support his work on agents and
actors: the Actor Model. And other computer
scientists said, “Oh, that is really interesting.
I’m going to program my stuff in it. Doesn’t
have anything to do with AI.” AI people want
to know what intelligence is, so that was a
programming language. We peel the onion off,
threw that layer away, and we go to the next
level. So AI, in a lot of ways, is advanced
computer science. It’s also mostly about
algorithms, and not entirely.
Here’s another thing to realize. Sometimes
people equate Deep Learning and
Connectionist learning – network-type learning
– with AI. That is it, it was a relatively new
development. Those are a relatively small part
of the toolbox of artificial intelligence. It is
working really well, surprisingly well, from my
point of view. But it is not as mature as other
areas. So, there is a large toolbox to draw on. I
would refer to these Deep Learning techniques
as “Connectionist” or data-driven.
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Then there is the alternative approach or
complementary approach, which is semantic,
conceptually-driven techniques that used to
drive the portion of AI that was referred to as
“expert systems” (an unfortunate name). I
really want to be careful about not giving false
expectations by giving things names like
“deep” and “learning” and “expert.” It is not
that. It is computers.
So, intelligent systems may or may not be
autonomous. They gain the ability to choose
with autonomy, as I will show you in a minute.
When they do, they can augment, multiply or
replace human efforts. So we have in there the
human augmentation model. We have the
human multiplication, labor multiplication, and
then
replacement.
Replacement,
or
substitution, is not the right way to think about
it, and I will tell you more about that in a
moment.
In conventional software, the programmer
makes a decision on the sequence of how the
program works. Maybe with some branching
stuff, but it’s well-defined in advance. One of
the key features of AI software and particularly
autonomy, is that you push that decision of
what to do out to run-time because that’s
where you have a lot of uncertainty, and you
do not know what the right sequence of things
to do is. So, you make that choice from a
limited number of predefined options. That is
fine. It is still deterministic, but you do not
decide until you actually have to.

David Atkinson:

Autonomous machines perceive, interpret,
decide, plan, and they act without the need for
direct control. “Autonomy” is a word with a lot
160
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of baggage these days, and we have already
heard lots of definitions. So, I get to give you
mine. It reflects the machines’ relative
independence and control authority, which
means it has been delegated the ability to do
something, to perceive some goal, to pursue
some goal within some constraints subject to
certain levels of monitoring. But it is always
contextual, and it is always with respect to
whoever owned that control authority before.
David Atkinson:

I was asked the question, “Will this all be
disruptive?” Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. Was this
super computer in my pocket disruptive? I can
get to any knowledge in the world anytime.
Yeah, it has changed the world in a lot of
positive ways. So when we are talking about
autonomous systems, now they can act in more
sophisticated, increasingly intelligent ways. In
fact, now have wheels and can go places, or
have arms and robots. Okay, yeah, we are going
to see massive disruption. Important to note,
this is why substitution is not the right way to
think about this either.
In almost all cases of the introduction of
automation into an existing system, there are
ripple effects. In any organization, there is
workflow, there are communications, there are
levels of responsibility. This gets touched by
the introduction of automation. The
introduction of autonomous systems with
decision-making capability adds another level
of disruption to it. So you have to consider
autonomy in this larger systems context, and
that is part of what causes the disruption.

David Atkinson:

How am I doing? Fine? Okay. So what is the
real story about autonomous vehicles. I am
161
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telling you the truth, first-hand knowledge of
emerging mobility companies, my experience.
I really worked hard to make this true. So, there
you go. Trust my authority.
David Atkinson:

So the component capabilities for autonomy
such as perception are maturing, and very
rapidly, and they are driving incremental
deployment of the elements of autonomous
systems, such as driver assistance. And you
could buy these today. In new cars, you can
spend the money, and you can get lanekeeping, and you can get highway cruise
control.
Around this subject of autonomous mobility,
we see that the evolution of an ecosystem of
companies now. There are lots of different
stakeholders who can find value in this for
different ways, but they have shared vision.
And now these companies are partnering up.
We see a multiplication of components
suppliers, the services that are needed for, what
five years ago, would have been a very absurd
part of artificial intelligence, now with
thousands of people working. And what is
really important is that there is enabling
infrastructure being put in place, a high-speed
communication, 5G networks.
5G is fast enough, so now you can just start
distributing computation from one computer
to another effectively. And cloud computing is
there, which means there is the potential for a
lot of sharing in the information. Today, there
are probably—I don’t know the exact number,
but oh, well—over one thousand autonomous
vehicles on the street in the US, in Europe, and
also in Asia.
162
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When you see pictures of these on the news,
they show you the ones that really look weird,
with the swirling LIDAR is on the top and the
racks that go, “Oh, nobody would ever buy
that car.” It’s like this is a test. Most
autonomous vehicles look like ordinary cars.
The ones I work with, and then Continental’s
Chrysler 300s, they are black. We have lots of
them. I mean, so they might stick out that way.
But otherwise, from the outside, they look like
ordinary cars. And that’s what you will buy
when they are available.
Here are some examples and my forecasts, and
in a couple of years, you can call me up and say,
“You were smart.” Or, “Boy, were you dumb.”
Driver Assistance, as I mentioned, you can buy
that now. App-based are now rolling out, like
Uber and Waymo, and they are moving very
fast. They are in one or two cities now. But I
know from being in the inside that they have
very aggressive growth plans. In another year,
you are going to go, “whoa.”
Self-parking–this is the part I love. How much
time do you spend parking? A lot. Looking for
a parking space. How would you like to roll up
to your destination, get out of the car, and say
“go park yourself?” And the car goes off, and
finds a parking spot and parks. Then when you
are done, you come out, and you go, “Pick me
up.” And it comes, and it picks you up.

David Atkinson:

And then it works. I am not saying it is perfect.
I am not saying it is perfect yet. Parallel parking
is hard for everybody, even for these cars. But
it does work, and companies are buying this
now. It is going to show up as an option in one
or two years in cars you can buy.
163
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Trailer hitching. I do not know how many
people pull a trailer. But trailer hitching is
difficult, and parking a trailer is really difficult.
Technology exists. It is in advanced
development.
Long-haul trucking. These are those big trucks
on the highways that go far, across the western
states, straight shot. These autonomous trucks
are very advanced right now. I have seen them
perform in what I think were very difficult
circumstances. They are hauling freight. They
are in pilot use by companies right now. And
we will see in the next two years growth in that
to hundreds and then thousands of trucks.
Right now, they have safety drivers, but there
is no need. I have seen a bunch of demos with
them. I have followed in chase cars. The safety
driver never touches anything. Not from
parking lot to parking lot. These are big, huge
trucks and they work great.

David Atkinson:

Now, that is a limited domain, and you can
make a lot of assumptions. And the company
that provides this has made a lot of
assumptions, but it works. Here’s something I
want you to think about. This is getting into
smart city now and tying into the infrastructure
question, intelligent intersections and traffic
control. So, this is a converging interest topic.
The cities want to reduce congestion, they want
to improve throughput, they want to get
workers from outside in and inside out very
quickly. And we have a technology now. We
have a pilot installation in Walnut Creek of
cameras and radars that get a complete 360degree view of all the cars, pedestrians, and
builds a model of the world. It watches where
an incoming car may be coming and cannot see
164
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a pedestrian, because there is a visibility
problem. It sends a message to the car saying
“There is a pedestrian you can’t see.” This uses
the European DSRC communications, which
we don’t have in the US yet but it is the kind of
technology that is coming. In fact, we have
demonstrated the ability to automatically brake
the car so it doesn’t hit the pedestrian. This is
important.
David Atkinson:

Anne Toomey
McKenna:

Intersections for pedestrians are the most
dangerous place to be. That is where a huge
number of accidents occur. If we have just
solved that part, then we have made a huge
dent in the safety problem.
And I have to make a dent.

David Atkinson:

Yes, I am going fast now. Okay, what about my
car? Because it is such a complex environment,
and you want to use it. And if you are saying,
“I have taken a craftsman wrench and tried to
pound a nail with it.” That is not what the
wrench was intended to do, but it works.
People do this routinely. They use technology
in ways that are not intended, but this is
dangerous. So if you use this outside of the
domain in which it was designed for, it is going
to cause a problem.

David Atkinson:

Now let’s put this all together on the last slide.
As AI increases in capability and controls more
and more systems, and interacts, it will become
an increasingly attractive target for bad actors.
Unfortunately, autonomous systems based on
artificial intelligence are vulnerable to unique
new attacks. Not to cyber-attacks as we know
them today, but new ones on various aspects
165
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of the system. And it is quite a difficult, real
situation. There are dozens of attacks
demonstrated in the laboratory right now.
Luckily, because it’s not a big target, there are
not too many out there on the road, actors
have not spent time doing this. And there are
no sufficient defenses today.
David Atkinson:

One day someone will publish a new attack.
Another day, the following week, there is a
defense. It is an arms race. This is not my area,
but it really makes me wonder how many
companies, including automotive, are going to
address these unique new challenges.
So what is the impact? Well, I mean,
degradation of performance, failure, privacy
breach. What if they hack and get a view of the
camera inside your car? Yes, there are cameras
inside your car for lots of reasons that we could
talk about. Worst case: they subvert control.
Now they are driving. This has been
demonstrated already. Without the AI, we can
already subvert vehicles. You could use it as a
computing platform. You can use it as a
stepping stone for other attacks just because
it’s connected to other cars and to the
infrastructure. And worst case: mischief or
physical attack.

David Atkinson:

Last week, we saw Baltimore traffic grind to a
halt because a gasoline tanker overturned at a
critical intersection. That was, of course,
human involved and not automation involved.
But let’s say it wasn’t. Now, it took them twelve
hours to fix that up. And a bad actor might
now go to another intersection and crash
another one, and then another one. Or you can
imagine a truck driving up on a sidewalk in a
166
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crowded city. There’s lots of ways that this
could go bad, and that is what needs attention.
Thank you very much.
Anne Toomey
McKenna:

Alan Wagner:

Thank you. Then we’re going to hear now from
Professor Wagner with some really fascinating
stuff.
Thank you! Yeah. I think I will be much more
brief. My name is Alan Wagner. I do
technology of science engineering, and really
trying to build these systems focusing on real
world ecology, valid types of experimental
systems and robots. And so, one example of
one area that I’m very interested in is
developing robots, and it is a robot here that
we named Emergie.
It’s an emergency evacuation robot. Maybe it
might looks like something that you would
want to pull the arms on like a slot machine.
But, nevertheless, I am trying to have these
things show up at your door. Even if you’ve
never interacted with a robot before. It is
seeing whether or not different types of people
will follow these types of robots in high stress,
high impact, high physical risk environments.
We believe that there is a lot of value to doing
this; ideally to reduce response time and have
something that could work in schools,
hospitals, any type of environment to get
people out as quickly as possible.

Alan Wagner:

We ran experiments doing this. They have
talked about them all over, and we want to see
whether or not people would follow these
types of things. We found that basically,
everybody will follow them. All the people we
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tested, no matter even if we told them the
robot was broken, they would follow it. And
so, this sort of shows the automation bias, and
the fact that people have a tendency to default
to believing that the technology is right even
when it’s behaving in ways that you know it
probably shouldn’t.
Alan Wagner:

In related conversations with the military, I
have spoken with fighter pilots. When we
talked to them about the possibility of using
drones in warfare, and one of their concerns
was, “What if this thing malfunctions? Will I
have to put myself at risk to try to save it?” And
these are sort of the things that come up in real
world environments as well.
We are also doing some other work, but the
goal of this project is develop robots that could
interact and learn how to play a game from a
child, and play the game the way the child
wants them to and wants to teach the robot.
Part of the advantage, again, is that the robot
could actually adapt its behavior to the
variations and local variations of the way the
child wants to play. But it also provides a fertile
ground for really human robot interaction
questions such as having common ground,
which is sort of a shared interactive experience,
and involving methods for having the robot
ask relevant questions that a child would
understand. And then, using those answers to
sort of build a structure of the game.

Alan Wagner:

We are also looking at some ways for machine
ethics frameworks, how can autonomous
systems decide what is right and what is wrong
using different frameworks such as
utilitarianism, Kantianism, and having the
168

2020

Autonomous Systems & Domestic Security

Symposium Issue

machine try to determine what the trade-off is
when you have two frameworks trying to do
different things. Autonomous driving, for
example, which Dave was talking about.
Alan Wagner:

For example, I moved here from Atlanta a
couple years ago. And in Atlanta (downtown
Atlanta), the speed limit is 55 miles an hour,
but everyone drives at about 70 to 75 miles an
hour. So it is an autonomous system. It has to
sort of answer this question: should I follow
the rules and drive the speed limit? Or should
I do what might be safer for everyone and drive
as fast as everyone else? This is a very
challenging system, or a very challenging
question for an autonomous system to answer,
or the people that write the code for it.
If you are Google, or whatever company, you
do not want to program in a code that says,
“Break the speed limits,” even if that may be
what is safer in the long run. So, we are looking
at architectures that may allow these types of
systems to kind of consider a broader
contextual framework.

Alan Wagner:

Finally, an even more strange and extreme kind
of project, we are looking at what happens
when an autonomous system tries to enforce
norms. What happens when an autonomous
system actually punishes people, and physically
punishes? We are looking at this. But we have
an exoskeleton that we have built, and this
exoskeleton is specifically built to a lock to
prevent someone from doing something. Part
of our hypothesis is that, people actually prefer
to be punished by an autonomous machine
than they would have human because these
autonomous machines do not judge. They
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don’t emotionally make you feel bad. They just
meter out the punishment. So this is one thing
that we are looking at, and I think I will end
with that.
Anne Toomey
McKenna:
Alan Wagner:
Anne Toomey
McKenna:

How did legal counsel feel about exoskeletons
that punish?
We have our own internal review. They are
fully aware there . . .
Did internal review approve this? I just want to
check the law.

Alan Wagner:

Nobody will get hurt.

Anne Toomey
McKenna:

Thank you. Thank you.

Alan Wagner:

My department head is here. I can see if she is
frightened right now.

[From Audience]:

I’m terrified.

Anne Toomey
McKenna:

Alan Wagner:

Okay, her palms are sweating, but then no
problem. No, so in terms of hearing those, that
is really real research going on right now here
at Penn State. And that is very cool to get. Just
to see this actual research that is going and then
in societal goals that you are attempting to use
autonomous systems for, in emergency
situations and rescue situations. And that
adaptability piece is so fascinating.
Yes.
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All of those human factors have to come in, so
I think it is going to be really interesting now
to turn it over to the Major and talk about this.
But if you can just give us that hands-on
understanding of how the Pennsylvania State
Police are using AI and autonomous systems
right now, and where you see its benefits and
where you see its constitutional concerns.
Thanks. There is no question that artificial
intelligence and autonomous systems are
having a significant impact on what we are
doing in law enforcement today. In my view,
mostly a positive impact.
It is changing at a rate that I have not seen
anywhere in my twenty-five-year career to this
point. But I think the challenge for us is to
continually innovate, to embrace these new
technologies to see how they fit into our world.
But also, respect and protect peoples’ privacy,
civil rights and civil liberties while we are doing
it. I find that the change in technology is
sometimes outpacing what the courts can help
us decide, or any policy that is set or any laws
that are passed to help govern this, which I
know Marc on the end is going to talk about a
little more.

Douglas Burig:

Just one of the technologies I will talk about
today, just to give you some real-world
examples of how is this benefiting you. How is
it helping to protect you and your families on a
daily basis? But we are having a tremendous
amount of success with facial recognition
technology. The same type of technology I
used to get through the encryption of my
laptop this morning just by looking at it, that
171

2020

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

Symposium Issue

you log into your phone or you tag your friends
on Facebook with is solving crimes every single
day.
Doug Burig:

Fifty years ago, because we know offenders are
largely recidivists, we would take bookings,
arrest photos, and show them the victims of
violent crime to go through them, to search
through it, and pick out the person who
committed that crime. Now, this intelligence,
this artificial intelligence can comb through
twenty million drivers’ license photos and three
million arrest photos in three or four seconds.
I mean, just think about the power that it has
today.
Just a couple of real-world examples, and these
are recent. First of all, this is one of the caveats
with facial recognition: it is not discriminative
enough to be considered identification. It is not
fingerprints. It is not DNA. There is a
disclaimer when you log into the system that
tells everybody that is using it that. So I don’t
want anyone to think that it is definitively the
person when this query comes back. And we
do not treat it that way. If we were to use that
in evidence, as probable cause for a search
warrant, it would become fruits from a
poisonous tree, and we would have no
foundation. So, we do not do that with this
technology.

Douglas Burig:

Also, it does not have to be a head on shot. The
technology is now 2D. When I first started this,
it had to be a pretty much a head-on shot. Now
if the head turns the side, it can interpret with
the data points and look on the other, and fill
it in. Of course, it is a lot less accurate that way,
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but just in the last couple of years, this has
changed dramatically.
Douglas Burig:

This is a case from four weeks ago. This is a
homicide in the eastern part of Pennsylvania. It
is still an ongoing case, so I cannot say a whole
lot about it. But a young man was killed and a
witness was able to give a nickname for the
individual, and a possible spot on Instagram to
look for them. That is all they had, and that is
the actual photo that was given. Obviously, the
center part of their face is blacked out.
How long would this have taken trying to get
an image out in the greater Philadelphia area to
identify this person? But our analyst sitting in
her cubicle in Harrisburg, in thirty seconds was
able to get a hit—what we would call a hit—on
this image for this individual. So, that is an
arrest booking photo from two years before.
Now, once they started layering in, and that is
really what makes it valuable in law
enforcement. We started layering in the other
data sources that we have, look at the criminal
history, and where does this person live. It
became apparent very quickly that this was
likely the suspect. This is transmitted to the
investigators, and through the independent
investigation,
and
eventually
witness
identification. This is the person, and he’s
currently awaiting trial for homicide.

Douglas Burig:

This is another one. Unfortunately, a young
woman was raped. This was North Central
Pennsylvania. This is November of 2018. She
did not know her attacker’s name, only knew a
nickname, and there had been some
conversation back and forth on a social media
platform. So this image was sent into our
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analysts who ran it through, and that is an
Instagram photo. Again, within about two
minutes, they were able to identify this person
or get what we would call a hit. A strong
correlation that it is likely the individual.
Douglas Burig:

It is interesting. When you see the returns
come back, you will see both males and females
because it is only looking at jaw angles, and
distance between your eyes, and things like
that. So, you will see both males and females
come back. Sometimes you will see the person
wearing the same clothing that they wore in
their driver’s license photo while committing
the crime. Or there will be a very distinctive
image. A tattoo that is visible on their neck
where you don’t have to be an expert or a
scientist to figure out that that is probably the
individual. Layer the other data sources onto it
and get it out to the people that are doing the
case.
How long, again, would it have taken to
identify this person through social media or
through banging on and just becoming part of
the daily news cycle? So, this is something that,
when I started law enforcement, we could only
dream of.

Douglas Burig:

On the national security side, this is a case the
FBI was working on. An international
terrorism suspect that had social media
presence in both a foreign country and in the
United States. They did not know who this
individual was. The case is going for quite some
time. The agent sent it in to us, and we were
able to identify the main target and three
accomplices. This is somebody that was
planning with other terrorists to do harm to the
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United States, yet it was in a Pennsylvania
database that helped bring together this
international terrorism case.
Douglas Burig:

It also shows the value of sharing information,
and working collectively with all of our
partners. Something that we learned well
before 9/11, but was certainly made
increasingly apparent after that horrible event.
I just want to talk briefly about some of the
protection. So we have access to all this
information. We have your social security
numbers. We have access to an incredible
amount of data that we are entrusted with. So,
how do we protect that? How do we ensure
that it is not misused?
We are very cognizant every single day that one
misuse of this type of technology can result in
it being taken away, and we would not be able
to get justice for other victims in future cases.
So we are very, very cognizant of that. We
don’t wield this lightly. I hear analysts and our
investigators talking constantly about how
much can we collect on this? Should we share
this? Who can we share this with? And that is
where we want to be in law enforcement. But
this includes the collection, the use, the
analysis, retention, destruction, sharing, and
dissemination of protected data on all fronts.

Douglas Burig:

First of all, the training component. Nobody
has access to the systems without extensive
training, without non-disclosure agreements,
without regular training. This includes both the
state statutes, which for criminal justice
information in our state is 9102, 9106 and Title
18. And the federal regulations 28 CFR, Part
23, which I just took my annual training on two
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weeks ago. Even at my level, I still do it every
year. I spend the three hours because I oversee
the program. That is how seriously we take it.
Douglas Burig:

Restricted access. All these systems are closed.
I think you have heard from the panelists
today, there is no system that can’t be
penetrated. However, I haven’t seen it on UC
systems that I am talking about today. They
have to meet pretty rigorous FBI CJIS
standards, which is criminal justice information
sharing systems. So they are defended about as
well as it possibly could be.
They also have really extensive audit trails. In
our intelligence system, it is searchable to the
keystroke. There are audits that are done by
outside people that don’t have a vested interest
in the Pennsylvania State Police, as well as
internal audit controls with mandatory
numbers of inquiries that you would have to be
at to look.
Do people abuse the systems or misuse them?
Unfortunately, that has happened. But many of
our people are not short timers. They are in this
for a career, typically. And the penalties include
suspension and termination, and I have seen
both for misuse of UC system. So, we take this
very seriously.

Douglas Burig:

Also, with our privacy policy, we are very
transparent. It is available on the state police
website, and we have a privacy attorney
embedded in our function with a top-secret
security clearance who has a backdoor, allaccess pass to everything that is going on. We
often speak to her during different aspects of
the collection or dissemination of information
to get her insight, and she has the right legal
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acumen to be able to do this. This is not
somebody we call the privacy officer. It is a
highly qualified individual, and I know our
federal partners operate the same way.
Douglas Burig:

But I hope that gives you a little better view,
and we could talk endlessly about the other
autonomous systems, UAVs, drones. The state
police just got into that technology. Just
purchased it. We took a little bit longer than
other agencies to get to that point because we
want to be very deliberate.
Just for example, the last helicopter we
purchased was $8.5 million. The drones we
bought this fall were $2,500. So, when you look
at efficiencies and uses, and the capabilities are
largely the same, especially if you are not in the
medical transport business. This is something
to think about. I don’t think we will have a fleet
of helicopters ten or fifteen years from now.

Anne Toomey
McKenna:

Douglas Burig:

Maybe, can you give them some examples of
how UAVs will economize what you need to
do across this big state?
Sure. Right now, we wanted to be conservative
when we started with this program. So, they are
being used for accident reconstruction. So
normally we would shut down a road, impede
travel and commerce for four or six hours at a
time. The drones are doing fly-overs. They are
doing several million data points, and usually in
about thirty minutes. From a lot of different
angles, we get all of the measurements that we
need and the road gets opened sooner. We are
also using it for a crime scene reconstruction.
We can get all the distance from the victim,
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from shell casings, and capture everything—
any weather in a matter of moments. We are
also using them in the search and rescue aspect
of things. Certainly, a lot quicker to get them
up.
Douglas Burig:

Also, in the special emergency response team,
we already have an exigent circumstance
around somebody’s property for shots fired,
for a barricaded gunman situation, and why
risk tactical members to go up to the window
and see if the person is lying in wait for those
officers? Or if he took his own life a half hour
ago, and they are flying up to these windows,
sending information real-time and out to
people on the scene that have to make
decisions.
We saw in Georgia overnight; two police
officers were shot trying to enter a house. A
hostage situation. Three people were killed. I
see a day where there will not be live police
officers, and I think my panelists would
probably agree, we will not be entering these
situations. It will all be autonomous vehicles
taking the risk.

Anne Toomey
McKenna:

Marc Canellas:

Thank you very much, Major. We have really
heard the broader concepts from Dr. Atkinson,
and Professor Wagner’s research, and I am
excited to turn this back to someone who
comes to us both from the technology
standpoint with the experienced research you
have done, and you are in the thick of law
school.
Yeah. I mean, it is wonderful to follow Doug,
especially someone who wants to go into
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criminal law. But on the defense side and has a
slightly different perspective.
Marc Canellas:

Yeah. No, but this is exactly the type of
conversations I think we need to be having.
That there are cases where this technology has
been used, is being used and actually has some
real promise. I am going to have a slightly
different take though.
I was trained in graduate school by Amy
Pritchett, along with one of her students, my
PhD advisor, Karen Feigh. And my training
was essentially, as someone brought up the
Boeing 737 MAX 8, our job was to make sure
the Boeing 737 MAX 8 would never have
happened. The interaction between the pilot
and the autopilot should never have become a
situation where it crashed into the ground. So
that is a very stark reminder of me of why I
went to law school, is to make sure bad things
like that don’t happen.
Coming from my background, I’m trying to
combine all of this and talk about challenges
and steps forward. The first one—and these
are five general thoughts that I have that are
hopefully somewhat provoking—give people
some thought. The first is that “Our wars are
all intertwined.” The war on terror, war on
drugs, war on crime. They share the same
technology, tactics and failures.

Marc Canellas:

I mean that to say that, especially at NYU
where I am, there’s the international law
people, and then there’s the criminal law
people, and there’s the IP and technology law
people, and these are all together. There may
be domains where they are applied, but the
tactics are being shared, the technology is being
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shared, and the failures translate as well. Even
the metaphor, the war metaphor, translates as
well.
Marc Canellas:

And so, we must look at how these
technologies are being deployed, outside of
things like accidents and crime scene
reconstruction. You have drones that were
developed for the military but used to surveil
Freddie Gray protests in Baltimore. You have
stingrays which simulate cell towers that were
developed for military purposes, then DHS
licensed them out to police forces, and now
they’re being used for domestic criminal
investigations.
You have advanced cyber and surveillance
techniques developed for the military, but then
unconstitutionally used against Muslim
populations by the NYPD. So, there are ways
that, not particularly-good-faith actors can use
these technologies against populations. And so
all the concerns about discrimination, disparate
effects on minority populations, and
criminalization of poverty, are influenced by
the technology developed in the international
scene. If you think about autonomous
weapons abroad, I hope we think, at some
point, about what happens when we arm
drones— what happens when we arm robots
in America? When you come face to face with
one? I would prefer a police officer. That is my
preference, but I think that’s a conversation we
have to have.

Marc Canellas:

Second, “technology is not neutral.” This is my
sort of slightly Southern coming through. It
ain’t magic, and it certainly is not our savior.
It’s not neutral. So even normative technology
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built with the best intentions can be used in bad
ways by people acting in bad faith. Body
cameras were supported by the NYPD and
even the ACLU for use in New York City. The
idea was that was going to bring accountability.
Marc Canellas:

But they did not realize its other potential.
There is a recent case just a few days ago, where
the NYPD settled the suit, where they had
edited videos to make it seem like they had the
warrant before they entered someone’s
apartment when, actually, they had flipped the
order of the video. So actually, they had
entered, already left, got the warrant, reentered, but edited the video to make it seem
like it was the other way around. So, when you
control the video of body cameras, if it’s not
governed correctly, if there’s not enough
safeguards in place, it can be used in bad ways.
Magic has already been talked about. Patrick
and Mike talked about this earlier. This is
advanced technology. It is. And it’s certainly
complicated and may have some emerging
properties, but it’s not magic. It’s also not our
savior, and I’ll leave this to Noreen, the
theologian, who will be talking in the next
panel. We cannot think of technology as the
only solution to our problems. That if only we
could use AI to filter out things like extreme
content, if only we had robots that could do all
the dirty, dull law enforcement work, we would
be better off.

Marc Canellas:

The minute we call it magic or deem it a savior,
and appeal to these higher powers where we
are abdicating control and responsibility for
our own actions and our own responsibilities
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as people in a democratic society. And I think
we have to hold that together.
Marc Canellas:

Anne Toomey
McKenna:
Marc Canellas:

Third, “law and policy are designed to be slow,
methodical and backwards looking.” I’ve used
the word design there very deliberately. They
were meant to be this way. When people
founded it, that was the goal. When law was
developed, precedence was the goal. And so
. . . Huh?
You’re good.
No, no. I want to make sure because the
question and discussion is going to be the most
interesting part. So, I hesitate to go down this
direction when I have an immense privacy and
a wiretapping scholar next to me.
But I think about the Carpenter case from
2018, which is, I think, a very useful example.
Hopefully, I get the story right. Otherwise, I
will get graded. Let’s say you’re arrested for
robbery, and the critical information that was
used to identify you, placing you at the scene,
was gathered by police who accessed your
physical location through phone records.
You’re convicted, but you’re really upset.
You’re saying, “There’s no way this can be
constitutional.” You think it violates your
Fourth Amendment right against warrantless
search against and seizure. So, you appeal. The
problem is, laws are based on precedents.

Marc Canellas:

For many years, there’s been something called
the third-party doctrine, where the minute you
gave up your information to a third party, it
was no longer yours to be protected against.
But in 2018, the Carpenter decision said that
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actually, there are certain ways that you are
protected against this third-party doctrine. You
may be very happy you won. But this has been
going on for twenty plus years, the law is not
proactive. Only when things go wrong, Only
when there’s been enough time to get it out
into the general public that certain things are
going on do we really see the law actually react.
It is not proactive.
Marc Canellas:

Maybe you say, “Oh, I’m going to go to
Congress. Congress will listen to me.” I have
lots of thoughts about that, obviously, given
my time there. But the problem is, Congress’s
primary job is also not to pass legislation. So,
they’re doing their job really well in some ways
at the moment.
But their job, the first thing I was told when I
worked there was, “Our job is not to pass good
legislation. Our job is to stop bad legislation.”
The entire process is built around the battles,
of people coming together, forcing laws into
action only when everyone can agree that this
is the right way to go. So, these are deliberate
bodies, whether it be law or government, that
are meant to go slowly.
As you think about the pace of technology, it
is inherently outpacing law and government.
We have to decide as people what we want to
do about that. Whether it’s the stories we tell
ourselves. Whether it’s the engineers coming
together and saying, “We need to self-regulate
and establish standards.” Whether it’s lawyers
coming to the fore. Whether it’s police
agencies saying, “We’re going to do this the
right way, even though there’s no law against
it.” So, we have to take control of it.
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The fourth one’s a little cryptic, “the oracle has
been poisoned.” This was when I worked on
the Hill in 2017 to 2018. I worked a lot on
election security. There were reports that the
Russian Internet Research Agency, which
helped do some of the cyber-attacks on our
electronically-influenced campaigns, they
called it “poisoning the oracle.” What they
meant was that elections are actually based on
trust.
Elections are based on trust. It’s not to
convince the winner they won. The winner
always thinks they won. It’s to convince the
losers that they lost. So it’s about trust. It’s
about trusting the process, trusting that people
got their vote counted correctly.
If you can convince people that their votes
were not counted correctly. If you can
convince people that there are nefarious actors,
deep state, fake news, rigged elections—
however you want to describe it—you can
undermine, even if you did not hack. Even if
you did not actually get in there and change any
votes, you’ve already destabilized it.

Marc Canellas:

And so, this idea of trust, which is why I know
a lot of what Alan does. Trust is inherently
critical to a lot of our general governing of our
society. And you can poison the oracle if you
can use things like deep fakes. So, you’re
recording video, you can create alternate video
making the President or anyone you want say
the things you want and have a video. That will
spread like fire across the Internet. You look at
India and Pakistan recently with their
information warfare, and reality does not
matter. If we live in a world where reality does
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not matter, everything starts to break down.
And AI is only going to increase that capability.
Marc Canellas:

Adversarial AI is another one of those things
where you can actually make an algorithm, by
attacking the data that it’s built upon,
characterize things wrong. Characterize threats
when there’s not a threat, and characterize
certain people as a threat when they are not.
That’s going to be a problem.
All of this to say the last point. I put it in bold
for a reason. “People are the beginning and
the end of everything.” They are the only
reason we care about things like autonomous
weapons, things like autonomous vehicles.
Yes, there’s efficiency, there’s money to be
made. But we care about the people’s lives that
are at stake. We care when and how people are
killed. We care about the safety of people.
That’s something we can’t forget. That’s what
I learned from my lab down at Georgia Tech.
If you don’t understand the humans involved,
their lives, their needs, their wishes, these
minority populations, these criminalized
groups. If you do not understand and you don’t
go out to reach them, you will never succeed.

Marc Canellas:

I just want to close and say, the hard questions
are not going to be technology questions. The
technology is sitting up here. The technologists
sitting there are brilliant. They’re going to
continue to do amazing things, I have no doubt
about that. The questions is: what do we want
them to do?
I love this discussion of storytelling. What
stories are we going to tell ourselves about the
future we want? What are the norms we’re
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going to set? If we don’t have that, then how
can we possibly ask Congress or the law to
reflect our will when we don’t even know what
our will is? And so, I think there are good ways
to do it, but I implore you to start with the
humans. Start with us. Thank you.
Anne Toomey
McKenna:

Alright, so we can take questions. But I am
going to go ahead and just ask questions for the
group. So, if you know you have a question that
you want to ask, please feel free to get up and
come to the mics.
I’m just finishing up and really setting the
broader question. How do we handle this from
a legislative and policy standpoint?
We see very different approaches, both with
your Europe’s EU’s GDPR, General Data
Protection Regulation, there’s very different
approach to data and use of data, including use
of data by algorithms because it’s all humans
that are doing this and driving this.

Anne Toomey
McKenna:

Audience:

In the U.S., how is that playing out? And what
I tried to set that stage for, and I think you’ve
gotten a little of this, is that we have this really
kind of disjointed approach to managing
autonomous systems because they fall in
different categories. So, they’re regulated by
different institutions and agencies. So, these are
some of the broader questions I know we think
about. I see that we’ve some people up here.
Thank you for that very interesting discussion.
My question has two parts, sorry about it. It’s
mostly directed to Marc because you talked
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about Carpenter, but anybody can answer it. Do
you think third party doctrine in this new era
of technology still a viable doctrine? Or do you
think we should throw it away?
Audience:

The second part is, and probably anybody can
answer this. Do you think our expectation of
privacy decreases as the technology rolls? Or it
stays the same, or even increases? Because we
have signed a lot of privacy policies and so on.

Alan Wagner:

I will defer to the leading scholar on things like
that, and then I can address the second part.

Anne Toomey
McKenna:

Anne Toomey
McKenna:

Okay, so, I’ll go with the first part. Just so
everybody in the room who are non-lawyers
understands that third-party doctrine states in
law, that if you share something with someone
else, you can’t really claim that you have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in it under
the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
The problem with third-party doctrine is that it
was passed in cases, precedents that occurred
long before the Internet existed. And so that
idea was, of course, if I’m sharing something
with David sitting next to me, how can I say I
have a right to privacy in it? As technology
changes, the platforms evolve. Every single
thing you do online, everything you do in our
society is necessarily shared with a third party:
the companies, the platforms that are operating
these technologies.
So, in Carpenter, the Supreme Court very
deliberately said, it is clear that we got
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indicators in earlier cases, in USP Jones, Judge
Sotomayor said it’s clear the third-party
doctrine is not working here. But very clearly
in Carpenter, Chief Justice Roberts made it and,
“Hey, this third-party doctrine is not working.
We can’t say just because we shared something
with someone using technology that we no
longer have a right to privacy.”
Anne Toomey
McKenna:

Remember, the piece of that, though, that’s
important in all of these conversations is:
there’s a massive distinction in the application
of law here. Private companies are not bound
or restricted by the First Amendment or the
Fourth Amendment. Only the United States,
only federal law enforcement, only the
government is restricted. So everything, that’s
the data aggregation that’s occurring, that’s
part of our problem. We don’t have parallel
privacy standards or parallel privacy law to
regulate what industry does versus what
government does.

Marc Canellas:

Yeah, and I would say to the question, I think
it’s our changing expectations of privacy. We
have quite a range of demographics in the
audience. I’m sure by generation we have
different expectations of privacy. The one I
always come back to is convenience.

Marc Canellas:

If you can make something convenient where
I don’t have to pay, I’ll give you all my data.
You make it convenient for me to reach out
and connect with family. Facebook sounds
great, even when people know what’s going on
in the systems. All this stuff with Facebook and
Twitter, whoever you want to pick out, people
still use it, because how else am I supposed to
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connect with all these people? So I think the
amount of convenience and in that trade off, I
think people are happy to give away that
convenience. But I think it’s also because they
have a new expectation of privacy.
Marc Canellas:

Anne Toomey
McKenna:

It’s not that they don’t know they’re giving up
the data to a third party. It’s that I trust that you
will be good with that data. I don’t know what
good means in that sense. But I think a lot of
us when we’re giving up data to some of these
companies or even to our universities, where
there have been lots of breaches, we’re
assuming that they’re acting in good faith. And
I think the key, as was just mentioned, is that,
commercial companies don’t have to have
good faith necessarily. And that’s the change.
I do think part of it, though, is that consumers
do not understand the amount of data that is
aggregated about them individually. That just
millions of data points that are aggregated
about each of us sitting in this room, whether
we are users or not of the platforms, somebody
we know is. Every person in this room has a
genetic profile that’s probably being captured
by 23andMe, and the like, because somebody
you know did it. It doesn’t matter if you did it
or not.
I think that part of it is a lack of understanding
in terms of what really is being given over for
the convenience.

Marc Canellas:

Yeah.

Audience:

I have a question that speaks to what a few of
you talked about, which is—it has to do with
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the atrophying of our skills based on our
reliance on technology. David, you talked
about the possibility of having a car that you
could just tell to engage in parallel parking. Of
course, parallel parking, which is notoriously
difficult, requires all sorts of skills that we been
a long-time honing, and a lot more time honing
before we had power steering.
Audience:

Before I could just look up phone numbers on
my smartphone—or my phone is storing most
of the numbers that I ever used—I had
memorized hundreds of phone numbers and,
actually, there are all sorts of therapies that
require kids to memorize numbers and recite
them backwards, and so on. So, we’re losing
the skills. Already they find that they have a
grave difficulty having adequate surgeons and
training surgeons because our fine motor skills
are starting to atrophy so much.
Alan, you talked about people being willing to
follow these emergency guided robots. Now,
that reliance on technology then has a feedback
loop, because the skills that you would use to
guide yourself in emergency will start to
atrophy, because we’re so willing to follow
technology. Personally, I refuse to follow my
ways about, maybe a third of the time, because
it’s wrong so often. But if it got more accurate,
I’m sure I would follow it.

David Atkinson:

I think there’s no question that we lose skills.
How many people know how to build a fire in
the woods with wet wood? Oh my gosh, okay.
I’m shocked. Okay, bad example. But the point
is, this is the history of technology. We don’t
build fires in California.
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The history of technology is giving up some
things. Okay, how many people know how to
shoe a horse? Okay, fewer good. Better
example. That used to be a real important skill.
It’s not anymore, and life has moved on and
there are alternate ways of getting the function
of mobility done. And so, I think we’ve
sacrificed a lot of skills. And the question is,
we’re not actually being conscious of the fact
that we’re shifting like that.
David Atkinson:

My kids can’t use a map very well at all. Their
entire world is based on point-to-point. I get
into my car here, and I follow the line on the
road, and then the phone tells me to follow.
And they just don’t have the spatial context
anymore.

Audience:

Do we have a grip on how this is affecting our
brain development, on how this is affecting our
evolution as a species? I mean, I think we don’t
take these costs seriously enough. It’s not just,
“well, I don’t need to shoe a horse anymore.
So, never mind, I don’t have to worry about
that.” These skills really are critical for
development at all stages of development with
children and learning.

Alan Wagner:

There is research showing and more recently
showing drops in empathy with younger
generation—specifically, people that grew up
with cell phones—lack of emotion recognition,
emotion understanding, nonverbal behavior.
These types of things. This all sort of shows a
very age-based curve which mimics, to some
extent, cell phone usage.

Alan Wagner:

We see that these things do impact people.
There’s especially more recent results that
show that children under the age of two or
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three that spend more than an hour on a phone
or any kind of device, lose language ability
pretty quickly. And that length, lost language
ability doesn’t come back very quickly. So this
is not necessarily permanent, but it is certainly
sort of delayed development with regard to
these technologies.
Alan Wagner:

So, you can wonder how the sort of humanoid
robot taking care of a child might impact them
if a cell phone is already impacting them.

Audience:

Sure. So this is actually a good segue into
things. My point is that, what I’ve been hearing
is sort of anecdotes, and you pick up the
elephant and you say, “This part doesn’t look
good.” There was a comment which says, the
audacity or something like that of human
beings to think that an automated plane could
fly. I think there is a reverse audacity in
thinking that you could actually beat a
computer in chess.
The point is not to pick individual pieces that
we say, we can find out several examples where
it’s bad, we can find out several examples
where it’s actually saved thousands of lives.
The thing to do, perhaps, is to get a total
evaluation, a more realistic evaluation with
projections, and then have a conversation. So,
is the conversation getting just primarily
focused on what we want to see? And should
we move on to a bigger picture overall
evaluation?

David Atkinson:

No, take a seat. There is a mindset that persists
that says, we’re going to put the human at the
center of things and consider the systems and
the technology around the human. But as our
machines get increasingly intelligent, as they
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communicate with us and ever more natural
ways, as they gain greater ability to manipulate,
they’re going to become more like partners and
less like tools. And we have to ask the question,
what is the combination of a person and a
machine together as two cognitive entities in
this larger system? What is the capability of that
larger system? And stop thinking about just the
human and augmentation is a partnership.
David Atkinson:

That may be far out, but that’s the vector.
That’s the direction we’re going. And so this is
a very good question, and thinking of things in
that system context.

Marc Canellas:

If I may, just briefly, to bring up something like
the Boeing accident, or autonomous vehicles,
or I think even like the face recognition
systems is exactly this. A lot of automated
systems are not designed even accounting for
the human at all. It’s, “I can do this cool thing.
I can deploy it really fast. I’m going to take the
market. This is going to be great.” Not, “how
can I design a good team mate?”
As we talk about in chess or driving, and I’m
sure a lot of the tools that are used by the
police. How can we work to together using
both of our skills, and both our checks and
balances on each other to make sure we’re both
operating effectively?
I think if you approach it from that mindset –
not as one has to be better than the other and
replace or substitute – but teammates. That is
the way to go about it. Unfortunately, I think
that’s often not the way it’s gone about.

Anne Toomey
193

2020

McKenna:

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

Symposium Issue

I think, I mean, the major gave us an example
of that’s how Pennsylvania State Police are
using facial recognition. So very, like, it’s a
team-based approach to the use of not just the
technology as this is the person, and the
technology is providing maybe more secure
responses than an eyewitness potentially could
at the get go. That combination of human
investigation and technology. We’re out of
time.
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